explore related questions that arise in theory and experiments when subjects make multiple decisions. These are questions of experimental design, theoretical interpretation of data, and behavioral impacts that arise from possible nonseparability of utilities: (a) among decision tasks in an experiment; (b) among risky choice options in an experiment; and (c) between decision tasks within an experiment and decision tasks outside the experiment. From a theoretical perspective, the issues appear to be somewhat different when the experiment involves decisions on a lottery space than when it involves decisions on a commodity space. 
Independence, Dual Independence, Wealth Effects, and Portfolio Effects
Many experiments on choice under risk (in a "lottery space") involve multiple decisions and random selection of one decision for money payoff. The rationale for this method can be illustrated by experiments on the preference reversal phenomenon in which the central question is whether subjects reveal inconsistent preferences in choice tasks and valuation tasks. The literature on the preference reversal phenomenon contains much discussion of methodological questions, which makes it a good example for present purposes.
An Illustrative Example: Random Decision Selection in Preference Reversal Experiments
Consider two simple (usually binary) lotteries A and B. Ask the subjects to choose between A and B and, also, to place minimum selling prices on the two lotteries (with an incentive-compatible revelation mechanism). A preference reversal occurs when a subject chooses one lottery in a pair but places the higher selling price on the other lottery. With experimental designs that discriminate between intransitivities and response mode (choice or valuation) effects, the data show that most preference reversals cannot be attributed to intransitivities (Tversky, Slovic, and Kahneman, 1990; Cox and Grether, 1996) . Robust preference reversals that are a response mode effect would constitute a serious problem for economics because they would support the conclusion that choice tasks elicit different preferences than do valuation tasks. 4 But suppose that an experimenter were to pay subjects for both tasks at the end of the experiment. In that case, an observed "preference reversal" of the above type would not be a problem for standard theory because it could result from a "portfolio effect" in the experiment. For example, suppose a risk averse subject prefers lottery A to lottery B and, given that returns in lotteries A and B are uncorrelated (because of experiment procedures), prefers the diversified portfolio (A, B) to the undiversified portfolios (A, A) and (B, B) . In that case, the apparent preference reversal could, instead, be an attempt to construct the individual's optimal diversified portfolio in the only way possible within the experiment: choose one lottery and place the higher selling price on the other lottery (because of preferring to keep this one to complete the portfolio).
Such possible portfolio effects can be avoided by realizing stochastic payoffs and crediting a subject's earnings after each decision. But this procedure changes a subject's wealth between decisions and introduces the possibility that an apparent preference reversal could be attributed to a change in risk preferences caused by the change in wealth, which is consistent with expected utility theory of choice under risk. It is not a problem for such theory if lottery A is preferred to lottery B at wealth w 1 while lottery B is preferred to lottery A at wealth w 2 w 1 . In order to avoid both possible portfolio effects and wealth effects, an experimenter can follow the accepted practice of randomly selecting one of a subject's decisions for payoff. But the validity of this procedure for solving the possible problems in interpreting data depends on the independence ≠ axiom of expected utility theory (Holt, 1986) . 5 It is the independence axiom that accounts for linearity in probabilities of the expected utility functional, which implies that random selection of one decision for payoff will preserve the preference for A over B in all decision tasks.
If, for example, the dual independence axiom (Yaari, 1987) is assumed, rather than the independence axiom, then the utility functional is always linear in payoffs but is linear in (decumulative) probabilities only if the agent is risk neutral. If the dual axiom is assumed then possible wealth effects pose no problem for interpreting data, because of linearity in payoffs, but random selection of one decision for payoff can be a problem. With probability transformation, the relevant distribution is the transformed cumulative (or decumulative) distribution of payoffs from all of the decision tasks in the experiment. With a functional of this type, introducing random selection of one decision for payoff changes the utilities of multiple decision tasks in a fundamental way. This implication holds for the dual theory of expected utility (Yaari, 1989) , rank dependent expected utility theory (Quiggin, 1993) , and cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). 
Current Relevance of Random Selection of a Decision
The above discussion used experiments on the preference reversal phenomenon as an example to explicate some conventions of experimental design that have general implications.
Some recent experiments reported in the literature reveal how these conventions, and their theoretical foundations, have current relevance. The recent papers discussed in following paragraphs are selected because they report experiments on important topics and incorporate 5 In order to avoid confounding preference reversals with empirical inconsistencies with the independence axiom, Cox and Epstein (1989) and Cox and Grether (1996) credited subjects' earnings after each decision and, subsequently, used econometric analysis of data to ascertain whether apparent preference reversals could be attributed to wealth effects. There were no significant wealth effects; hence the data provide tests for preference reversals that are not confounded with violations of either the independence axiom or the dual axiom. 6 Tversky and Kahneman (2000, pp. 25-26) maintain that, as an empirical result, in some contexts subjects isolate on individual decision tasks in multiple task experiments. Such behavior is inconsistent with rank dependent theories, including cumulative prospect theory.
experimental designs commonly used in the literature, not because these papers should be singled out for special criticism.
Recent papers report experiments that introduce role reversal into the investment game is randomly selected for payoff in order to avoid confounds from possible portfolio or wealth effects. As explained above, the theoretical foundation for this method is the independence axiom of expected utility theory; interpretation of data from these experiments is different if the subjects are not expected utility maximizers. If, for example, we assume the dual independence axiom rather than the independence axiom then the probability distribution in the utility functional is the transformed cumulative (or decumulative) distribution of payoffs from all of the decision tasks in the experiment, compounded with the distribution for random decision selection. In that case, for example, the row in the Holt-Laury decision task table at which a subject switches from one lottery to another has a different interpretation for a subject's revealed risk attitude. Given the dual axiom, one should pay off after every decision, since wealth effects are irrelevant, and thereby avoid aggregating risks associated with the decision selection lottery with all of the underlying lotteries included in the decision tasks. This alternative of paying after every decision is also appropriate for other decision theories, such as prospect theory, in which the utility functional is defined on income rather than terminal wealth.
Relevance to the Social Context Experiment
The experiment in Cox (2000) , cited by Smith (2008, p. 23) , used random selection of one of two decision tasks for payoff and a double blind payoff protocol. Introduction of the second task had no significant effect on first movers' behavior in the investment game but significantly shifted behavior of second movers in the investment game and dictators in both the first-mover dictator-control game and the second-mover dictator-control game towards more generosity. One possible explanation of this finding is that subjects' behavior is inconsistent with the independence axiom and that this accounts for the effect of existence of the second task on first task choices. This possible explanation could, of course, be checked by repeating the experiment with one change: inform the subjects that they will be paid between the first task and the second, as-yet-undefined decision task in the two-task treatment. If the difference between the one-task and two-task treatments were to disappear with this design then one could attribute the social context effect to inconsistency of behavior with the independence axiom (and consistency with the dual axiom). If the difference between the one-task and two-task treatments were to be robust to this change in payoff procedures then we would have to look for other possible explanations that create interdependence between sequential decision opportunities.
An interesting candidate explanation is that existence of the second task induces a generalized "trusting" response in the first task, in which subjects try to encourage more generous behavior by others in the second decision task. This explanation can accommodate the insignificant change in first mover behavior in the investment game by postulating that the conditions can be tested. 10 Finding low rates of violation of the one type of necessary condition is an important result, but it does not support the conclusion that the subject's behavior can be rationalized by a utility function. This is a prominent example that illustrates Smith's (2008, p.2) point that we are often not careful about distinguishing between "if-then" and "if-and-only-if statements."
10 One known exception are data from the closed economy experiment reported in Battallio, et al. (1973) , as analyzed in Cox (1997) . But such data are extremely hard to generate and may contain significant subject selection effects because experimental closed economies are typically populated by incarcerated individuals such as residents of mental hospitals or prisons.
